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Abstract
The metaphor of a branching tree of future possibilities has a number
of important philosophical and logical uses. In this paper we trace
this metaphor through some of its uses and argue that the metaphor
works the same way in physics as in philosophy. We then give an
overview of formal systems for branching possibilities, viz., branch-
ing time and (briefly) branching space-times. In a next step we
describe a number of different notions of possibility, thereby sketch-
ing a landscape of possibilities. In the final section of the paper we
look at the place of branching-based possibilities in that larger land-
scape of possibilities. Our main message is that far from being an
outlandish metaphysical extravagancy, branching-based possibilities
are epistemically as well as metaphysically basic.
Keywords: Branching time, branching space-times, modality, possibility, ex-
periment
The metaphor of branching is useful for describing a certain type of modality:
an open future can be pictured as a branching tree of concrete possibilities. In
this paper we will look at the place of branching-based possibilities in the larger
landscape of possibilities. The main message is that far from being an outlandish
metaphysical extravagancy, branching-based possibilities are absolutely basic.
The paper is structured as follows: In §1 we trace the branching metaphor
through some of its uses and argue that the uses in philosophy and in the sciences
are of a piece. In §2 we briefly describe two formal frameworks for branching-
based possibilities, branching time and branching space-times. §3 centers on
the notion of a scientific experiment to motivate different types of possibilities,
thereby giving substance to the idea of a rich landscape of possibilities. In the
final §4 we argue for the basic nature of branching-based possibilities vis-à-vis
other types of possibility.
∗Copyright by the author. Forthcoming in Synthese.
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1 “Branching”
The notion of branching is a forceful metaphor that has many uses; the use in
logic and metaphysics is just one among many. As a first step, it is therefore
appropriate to look at the literal use of the word “branching”, and to trace some
of its figurative uses. In line with a general science-friendly methodology, exam-
ples will be chosen from various scientific contexts. Some relatives of “branching”
such as “forking”, “ramifying” and “bifurcating”, will also be considered.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to branch is simply to bear or
put forth branches, or to ramify. In its literal use, “branching” is what trees
or other plants are doing as they grow. “To branch” is a verb descriptive of
specific spatial processes; its noun cognate, “branch”, describes the product of
such processes. Both words are also used figuratively for non-biological spatial
structures such as rivers. Its use in engineering follows suit—think of roads, wa-
ter supply installations, or electrical wiring. Figure 1 illustrates the engineering
use. We will take all uses of “branching” descriptive of spatial structures or
Figure 1: From a Pittsburgh patent application for a “method of dividing and
branching electric cables” (Waring, 1882).
processes, whether literal (as in biology) or figurative (as, e.g., in geology and
engineering), to be unproblematic.
The common feature of these uses is that a unified spatial structure (the
trunk; a piece of the river; the wires to the left in Figure 1), which has a preferred
direction from some “source” to some “terminal” (from roots to tips; downstream,
downhill, from source to sea; from socket to appliance), divides into many parts
without losing contact with the source. The direction is crucial: we distinguish
between branching—a downstream fork—and confluence—an upstream fork—,
or between fission and fusion. Thus, the Ohio river doesn’t branch into the
Monongahela and the Allegheny at the Point in Pittsburgh—rather, the Ohio
is a confluence of the two others.
There are other, metaphorical uses of “branching” that cannot be interpreted
spatially, both in the sciences and in philosophy. These uses are at least not
straightforwardly unproblematic, and it is important for us to consider their
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interrelation. As we are not talking about spatial structures, the question arises
whether there still is a common abstract description that unites these uses.
Saunders has recently claimed that the parallel use of the term “branching”
in physics and in philosophy is a “coincidence in the terminology” (Saunders,
2010, 197). This claim should however be found implausible when the following
examples have been considered:1 In all these examples, we can find the features
of trunk, directionality, continuity, and separation of one into many, in one form
or other.
Radioactive branching. Some radioactive substances, such as actinium-226
(Z = 89), can decay in a number of different ways. Thus, for 22689 Ac,
β− decay into thorium-226 is the most common way of decaying (83%),
but electron capture and α decay as different modes of disintegration also
occur and lead to different products.
Radioactive branching was noted as a phenomenon in the 1910s, and
branch ratios between different decay paths were measured; for an early
review article, see Feathers (1947). Note that the metaphor of “branch-
ing” is here used independently of any spatial structure, and is directly
related to indeterministic possibilities. Furthermore, branch ratios de-
scribe objective phenomena, they are not tied to any scientific theory,
and they were measured well before the advent of quantum mechanics,
let alone a theory of electron capture or quantum-mechanical tunneling.
(Of course, quantum-mechanical modeling of the atomic nucleus helps to
explain them.)
Branching stochastic processes. Kolmogorov and Dmitriev (1947) investi-
gated what they called “branching stochastic processes”: mathematical
structures that can represent temporally successive chance set-ups. The
notion is retained in the subsequent literature. The authors mention that
their “stochastic scheme has various applications in biology, chemistry and
physics of elementary particles” (p. 5). A further important application
for the resulting theorems is in controlling nuclear fission, a hot topic at
the time. Nuclear chain reactions can be modeled as branching stochastic
processes, and obviously there is an interest in navigating the thin line on
which nuclear chain reactions neither die out nor blow up exponentially
(and literally): that is how a nuclear power plant operates.
Branching in Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Everett
worked on his dissertation under Wheeler in the mid-1950s. In a footnote
in his famous paper, “ ‘Relative state’ formulation of quantum mechanics”
(Everett, 1957), he illustrates his conception of branching superpositions
with the image of simultaneously equally real branches, none of which
would be special:2
1No claim to historical exhaustiveness or even representativity is intended.
2Wheeler didn’t approve of Everett’s notion of branching; the note was added in proof,
too late for Wheeler to toss out. Apparently Everett had used biological analogies in work
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From the viewpoint of the theory, all elements of a superposition
(all “branches”) are “actual,” none any more “real” than the rest.
(Everett, 1957, 459n)
Everett argues that on his scenario, our experiences would be exactly as
they are now. This interpretation of quantum mechanics has given rise to
a very lively discussion, not the least about whether it should be called
an interpretation at all, and on how we can understand its underlying
metaphysics.
Those were some scientific examples of the use of the branching metaphor. In
all these examples, the directionality is given by, or is at least parallel to, the
temporal order: a unity becomes many over time. There is also a mathematical
use of the branching metaphor, for which, by the nature of the subject, the
temporal order can play no role. The direction here is rather given in the
interpretation of the respective mathematical structures, either with a view
towards (temporal or spatial) application, or perhaps via some sort of (spatial
or temporal) visualization.
Branching in logic and mathematics. Many structures in mathematics and
in logic are said to be branching, ramifying, or bifurcating. The AMS sub-
ject classification (AMS, 2010) currently lists 32 whole subfields of mathe-
matics carrying these words in their title. To mention just a small number
of early examples: Russell (1908) and later on, in Principia Mathematica,
Whitehead and Russell (1910) propose ramified type theory, in which each
simple type ramifies into a hierarchy of types to avoid impredicability.3
Lindenbaum and Tarski (1936) employ the notion of (non-)ramifiability4
of logical theories in their research on categoricity. Hopf (1942) explores
the notion of bifurcation in dynamical systems. Examples can be mul-
tiplied almost indefinitely. Maybe the purest example, on which many
others can be modeled, comes from the theory of orders: A partial order-
ing 〈P,<〉, where < determines a natural “forward” direction, is said to
be branching (to the right, or forward) iff there are x, y, z ∈ P for which
x < y and x < z while neither y < z nor z < y nor y = z. Trees—
specific branching partial orders—are ubiquitous in logic and in computer
science.5
There is a number of different philosophical uses of the branching metaphor:
uses that point to spatial structures, but also properly temporal ones. Tree-like
leading up to his thesis, e.g., the image of an amoeba splitting in his “Probability in wave
mechanics”. By the time of the thesis, however, he had dropped talk of amoebas; see Byrne
(2010, 525f.).—The image of “many worlds” was introduced later, by DeWitt (1970).
3See Church (1956, § 58) for details.
4The German original has “Gabelbarkeit”. Thanks to Jan Woleński for drawing my atten-
tion to this example.
5In fact, trees are usually defined via backward non-branching, i.e., the non-existence of
elements x, y, z for which x < z and y < z, but x and y are incomparable. This leaves only
forward branching, with linearity as a degenerate special case.
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structures that can be read spatially occur frequently in philosophy, e.g., in the
form of various taxonomies like the arbor porphyrii. We will consider exclu-
sively the philosophical image of branching in (or of) time as a representation
of possibilities, and its refinements.
Branching in (of?) time. The image of a branching future as the home of
open possibilities appears to be quite natural. We subscribe to the picture
that things may go one way or the other—a spatial branching metaphor.
This is a well known topic in literary writing. Borges is famous for his
short story, “The garden of forking paths”, written in 1941 and translated
into English in 1948 (the Spanish original has “se bifurcar”). The story
overlays a spatial branching structure of garden paths with the metaphor-
ical branching of time.6 Incidentally, Borges admits both forward and
backward branching.
Branching time As far as we know, the image of a branching future of pos-
sibilities appears in logic for the first time in 1958, in a letter that Saul
Kripke, then a beginning student on his way to Harvard, wrote to Arthur
Prior.7 In 1957, Prior had just published his Oxford John Locke Lectures
of 1955/56 as the book Time and Modality (Prior, 1957), which marks
the beginning of his project of tense logic. Questions of the interaction of
time and modality were crucial for this project from the beginning. In-
deed, Prior argues that his “tense logic [. . .] is a modal system” (p. 12).
The basic idea at the time was that possibility should be something like
truth at some time, so that φ is possible if and only if φ is either true now
or will be true at some time in the future. This was called “Diodorean pos-
sibility”, after an association with the so-called Master Argument of the
Megarian philosopher Diodorus Cronus. The definition of the Diodorean
possibility operator PossD: is
PossD:φ⇔df φ ∨ Fφ,
where F is Prior’s future-tense operator, “it will be the case that”.8 The
metaphor that possibility is truth somewhere or somewhen is strong in
many philosophers; the image is kept up, e.g., in Lewis’s modal realism.9
Kripke suggested, instead of the Diodorean approach, to unite time and
modality as two separate interpretations of a single relational structure,
6Cooper, who had independently discovered Everett’s theory together with a student
(Cooper and Van Vechten, 1969), explicitly references Borges’s story, saying that in it, “the
poet has preceded the scientist” (Cooper, 1976, 45).
7The letter will hopefully be published in a collection of writings on Prior edited by Peter
Øhrstrøm.
8Prior actually defines the possibility operator via metric tense logic (Prior, 1957, 13), but
this is immaterial for our discussion here.
9See, e.g., Lewis (1986).—Apparently Peter Geach was the first to suggest a space-traveling
metaphor for the “accessibility” relation that was being introduced into the semantics of modal
logics around 1956; he spoke (actually in a somewhat mocking tone) of a “dimension-jumping
vehicle” that would take one along that relation between possible worlds; see Prior (1962).
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creating what may be the first diagram of “branching time” in logic.
(Kripke does not use the word “branching”, but he calls his diagram a
“tree”, displaying the root at the top as is common in logic.)
Branching time was researched into in the 1960s, and by 1970, there was
a useful semantic framework for a temporal-modal language based on
branching time (Thomason, 1970, 1984). Branching time allows one to
define the notion of a possible course of events as well as the notion of
momentary open possibilities; see §2.1 below for an overview.
Branching space-times The framework of BT was employed, e.g., for a for-
mal logic of agency (Belnap and Perloff, 1988). Problems in that specific
application, as well as considerations of relativistic physics, led to the
development of the framework of branching space-times (Belnap, 1992),
which to date is the most advanced formal framework for describing bran-
ching-based possibilities. It allows for the definition of spatiotemporal
possible courses of events and truly local possibilities. See §2.2 below for
a brief overview.
Branching metaphysics and persons From logic, the notion of branching
was introduced into the discussion of modal metaphysics. In fact, Kripke
was one of the key proponents of branching-based possibilities. The no-
tion of a rigid designator—a syntactical category of singular expressions,
like proper names, that are to refer to the same individual across differ-
ent possible circumstances—, plays an important role in his Naming and
Necessity (Kripke, 1980). Kripke’s theory is not limited to proper names
for persons; in fact he uses Frege’s example of the morning star and the
evening star to make his point about a posteriori necessities. However,
Kripke does use the example of proper names of persons to make a case
against Lewis’s anti-branching, divergence-based counterpart theory for
de re modality, most famously via his example of U.S. presidential candi-
date Humphrey, who “couldn’t care less whether someone else, no matter
how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible
world” (Kripke, 1980, 45n13). (The point remains contentious; cf., e.g.,
Hazen (1979) and Mackie (2008).)
Discussions about the metaphysics of personal identity and fission were
linked with the idea of branching after Shoemaker’s famous thought-
experiment of brain transplants, which was extended to partial brain
transplants as possible cases of personal fission; for an overview, see Wig-
gins (2001). Partially motivated by practical considerations (expectations
about the future), Lewis developed his metaphysics of modality based on
non-branching (“diverging”) possible worlds as an alternative to a branch-
ing theory and published an influential but also much debated argument
against branching in his book, On the plurality of worlds (Lewis, 1986,
206ff.). The discussion surrounding the metaphysics of branching for indi-
viduals, and especially for persons, is intertwined with questions of criteria
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for (personal) identity and remains controversial; we will not enter this
topic in this paper.
The above examples give strong support to the claim that the uses of the
branching metaphor in quantum physics, in logic and in metaphysics, which
originated at almost the same time in the late 1950s, are really of a piece: the
metaphor, which suggests trunk, directionality, continuity and separation of
one into many, works in the same way. The mentioned uses all have a common
root in mathematical branching structures and develop such notions in further,
domain-specific ways, with the sense of directionality supplied by the temporal
order.
2 Formalities of branching
In this section we will be concerned mainly with the exposition of branching
time (BT; §2.1), giving only a brief overview and pointers to the literature for
branching space-times (BST; §2.2). Both frameworks allow for the definition of
real possibilities, which are indexically tied to some context rather than abstract.
This notion is parallel to the linguists’ category of circumstantial possibility; see,
e.g., Kratzer (1991).
2.1 Branching time (BT)
As mentioned above, BT is an application of well-known mathematical struc-
tures—backward non-branching partial orders—for the semantics of a tempo-
ral-modal language. We will limit ourselves to a simple propositional language
that has
• a set Atoms of atomic propositions,
• the standard truth-funtional connectives, taking conjunction, “&”, and
negation, “¬”, as basic and the rest as abbreviations,
• Prior’s tense logical operators for past and future, where we take the strong
operators “H”, it has always been the case that, and “G”, it is always going
to be the case that, as basic, and define the weak ones (“F ”, future, and
“P ”, past) in the standard way:
Fφ⇔df ¬G¬φ; Pφ⇔df ¬H¬φ,
• a strong modal operator Sett: for “settled truth”, also known as “histori-
cal necessity”; the dual weak operator for “historical possibility” is again
defined as an abbreviation via
Poss:φ⇔df ¬Sett:¬φ.
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For the semantics, we need the following:
BT-frame: A BT-frame is a non-empty partial order 〈M,≤〉 (i.e., a nonempty
set M with a transitive and antisymmetric relation ≤) such that
(1) there is no backward branching, i.e., for allm,m′,m′′ ∈M for whichm′ < m
and m′′ < m, we have either m′ ≤ m′′ or m′′ ≤ m′;
(2) any elements m and m′ have a greatest common lower bound in M ;
(3) M has no maximal or minimal elements, i.e., for any m ∈ M , there are
m′,m′′ ∈M s.t. m′ < m and m < m′′.
In clause (1) we have used the strict < order corresponding to ≤, which is
defined, as usual, via
m < m′ ⇔df (m ≤ m′ & m 6= m′).
Of the mentioned conditions, (1) is standard, (2) is sometimes considered op-
tional, but is crucial for our system (guaranteeing connectedness of the structure
as well as the right topology in the continuous case), and (3) is just a simplifying
assumption saving us a number of extra clauses.
In a BT-frame we can single out the set Hist of histories: h ⊆M is a history
iff h is a maximal linear subset, or a maximal chain, in M , i.e., a set that is
linearly ordered (for any m,n ∈ h, either n ≤ m or m < n) and such that no
proper superset has that feature. In terms of histories, condition (2) says that
all histories have a non-empty intersection, and that that intersection contains
a greatest element. By (1), histories are downward closed, i.e., if m ∈ h and
m′ ≤ m, then m′ ∈ h.
The basic elements of so-called Ockhamist BT semantics are derived from
BT-frames.
BT-model, point of evaluation: The set M/Hist of points of evaluation
(points at which a formula can be evaluated as to its truth or falsity) consists
of all pairs m/h for which m ∈ h, i.e.,10
M/Hist := {m/h | h ∈ Hist & m ∈ h}.
Thus, generally we need both a moment and a history through that moment to
evaluate a formula. A BT-model is a BT-frame 〈M,≤〉 together with a valuation
V : Atoms×M/Hist 7→ {0, 1}.11
Semantics: Given a model M = 〈M,≤, V 〉, the basic clause for atoms is,
standardly:
• M,m/h |= p iff V (p,m/h) = 1.
10We use the suggestive notation “m/h” for the ordered pair of m and h in order to stress
the presupposition that m ∈ h.
11Sometimes a valuation is defined as a mapping from Atoms×M to {0, 1}; the difference
is not important for our discussion here. (Considerations of uniform substitution in a proof
system favour the definition given in the main text; see Thomason (1970, 280).)
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The clauses for propositional operators are standard. For the tense and modal
operators we have the following:
• M,m/h |= Hφ iff for all m′ ∈ h for which m′ < m, we haveM,m′/h |= φ;
• M,m/h |= Gφ iff for all m′ ∈ h for which m < m′, we haveM,m′/h |= φ;
• M,m/h |= Sett:φ iff for all h′ ∈ Hist for whichm ∈ h′, we haveM,m/h′ |=
φ.
From these clauses we can see that the only operator whose clause really forces
the recursive use of a history parameter for evaluation, is the future tense oper-
ator G: in the clause for H, the requirement that m′ ∈ h is in fact superfluous,
by downward closure of histories, and in the clause for Sett:, the initially given
history is not used, as all histories through m are quantified over.
This is as is to be expected for a logic for an open, branching future of
possibilities: we need to know which of the multiple possible futures we are
considering if we want to evaluate a sentence about the future. Crucially, a
context of utterance does not supply us with a “history of the context”, which
would amount to singling out “the real future”. There is some debate about this
feature of the semantics, with some authors proposing a “Thin Red Line” that
specifies “the real future” (see, e.g., Øhrstrøm (2009) and Malpass, this issue);
there is however a truly indeterministic reply, spelled out by Belnap (2002a). In
what follows, we will not pause to consider these semantic matters, but focus
instead on a few structural features of BT that should be uncontroversial also
for proponents of a Thin Red Line.
The structure of BT suggests a natural definition of the real possibilities at
a moment, which is based on the notion of division of histories at a moment :
• Let m belong to histories h1 and h2, i.e., m ∈ h1 ∩ h2. h1 and h2 are
called undivided at m (written h1 ≡m h2) iff there is some m′ ∈ h1∩h2 for
which m < m′. Being undivided at m is an equivalence relation on the set
Hm of histories containing m. Reflexivity and symmetry are trivial.12 For
transitivity, let h1 ≡m h2 as witnessed by m′, and h2 ≡m h3 as witnessed
by m′′. As m′,m′′ ∈ h2, we have m′ ≤ m′′ or m′′ ≤ m′ (by linearity of
histories); assume the former (the other case is analogous). By backwards
linearity we get m′ ∈ h3, so that m′ also serves as a witness for h1 ≡m h3.
• We say that h1 and h2 split at m (written h1 ⊥m h2) iff m is maximal in
h1 ∩ h2.
• The real possibilities at m are the members of the partition Πm of Hm
induced by the equivalence relation of undividedness at m, ≡m.
• We say that m is a choice point iff Πm has more than one member, i.e., if
there are at least two histories splitting at m.
12For reflexivity we require that there be no maximal moments; an easy patch is available
for the general case.
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In this way, BT allows us to talk of real possibilities at a moment: the parti-
tion Πm embodies the real possibilities open at m. These possibilities form an
exhaustive set of mutually exclusive alternatives. A full probability theory can
be built upon the structure of such possibilities in BT, and even, in BST; see
Müller (2005) and Müller (2011b).13
The last important feature of BT to be discussed here, which will be impor-
tant below, is the definability of a global modality. Recall that a guiding idea in
modal logic is that possibility is to be truth in some case (or “world”), whereas
necessity is truth in all cases. This idea was generalized by the now standard
Kripke-semantics, which is based on a relation of relative possibility between
cases. We can read a BT-frame as a structure of relative accessibility, where the
accessibility relation is the (temporal-modal) ordering, ≤.
None of the intensional operators defined above directly expresses “real pos-
sibility or necessity tout court” (to be symbolized ♦φ; φ), i.e., the fact that
some φ holds in some or in all cases (where the cases are the points of evaluation
m/h). And normally we know that we cannot define such a modality by clauses
embodying the idea of relative accessibility, like all our semantic clauses above.
The basic fact here is that a normal modal logic cannot discern disconnected
substructures; modal logic is, as one of the clauses of the Goldblatt-Thomason
theorem tells us, invariant w.r.t. disjoint unions of models (Blackburn et al.,
2001, 142).
Here however we know, via clause (2) of the above definition of a BT-frame,
that we are dealing with a single connected structure, and we have operators
moving us back and forth on histories (G and H), as well as an operator that
switches histories (Sett:). This, together with the absence of minima (clause (3)
above), allows us the following definition:14
φ⇔df HSett:GSett:φ.
It is easy to check that this clause really reaches all points of evaluation m/h ∈
M/Hist. The respective global possibility operator is the dual,
♦φ⇔df ¬¬φ↔ PPoss:FPoss:φ.
It is natural to identify this ♦ with the notion of real possibility tout court :
something is really possible if we can now say that there was a time at which
13An alternative, better format for representing such possibilities uses the notion of a tran-
sition (von Wright, 1963; Belnap, 1999): a transition t is an ordered pair 〈m,H〉 consisting of
an initial (a moment m ∈M), together with an outcome (one of the real possibilities at that
moment, H ∈ Πm). Employing suggestive notation, we also write t = m  H; TRm is the
set of all transitions with initial m. A transition is trivial if there is no alternative transition
with the same initial. If m is not a choice point, then TRm = {t} with t = m Hm, a trivial
transition. We can alternatively speak of Πm or of TRm as the set of possibilities open at
m; working with sets of transitions simplifies the technical development, e.g., of probability
theory. See the references in the main text.
14In the presence of minima, we can still define the global modality, albeit in a somewhat
more involved manner: we can use
φ⇔df Sett:φ & HSett:φ & Sett:Gφ & HSett:GSett:φ.
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it could have been possible. Such real possibilities are still indexically tied to a
context of utterance; they are genuinely thisworldly. As we will see below, other
notions of possibility lack this feature.
2.2 Branching space-times (BST)
We remarked above that BST, developed by Belnap (1992), is a natural ex-
tension of BT that can be motivated by considerations of agency and/or of
relativity theory. Consequently, that framework has been described as “equally
proto-scientific and proto-humanistic” (Belnap, 2007a, 19); it allows for appli-
cations with respect to both what Sellars (1963) calls “the manifest image” and
to what he calls “the scientiifc image of man”.
The main technical change in moving from BT to BST is that histories in
BST are no longer required to be linear; instead, they are taken to be maximal
directed sets in a partial ordering (a set X is directed if for any x, y ∈ X there
is some z ∈ X s.t. x ≤ z and y ≤ z), where that partial ordering is allowed to
have backward branching (to be read as spatial separation).
For our purposes here, the most important point is that BST, like BT, allows
for the definition of real possibilities, which in BST are local in the literal sense of
corresponding to possible spatio-temporal courses of events in the causal future
of some given event. Again, such possibilities are represented by a partition of
a set of histories containing a certain initial event, thereby forming an exhaus-
tive set of pairwise exclusive alternatives. The crucial feature allowing for the
definition of the relevant partition is the specific topological structure of branch-
ing enforced by the so-called prior choice principle of BST, a generalization of
condition (2) in the definition of a BT frame above.
In order not to burden this paper with further technical details, we only
give references to a number of papers developing the ideas of BST in different
directions pointing to specific applications:
• Introductory accounts to BST are given by Belnap (1992) and Belnap
(2007a).
• The theory of causation via causae causantes as INUS conditions is given
in Belnap (2005).
• For an aplication of BST to the semantics of counterfactuals, see Placek
and Müller (2007).
• Objective single case probabilities based on BST are developed in Weiner
and Belnap (2006), Müller (2005), and Belnap (2007b). A rather pre-
liminary application in quantum information theory is sketched in Müller
(2007); for an analysis of Bell’s theorem, see Placek (2010).
• Minkowskian models for BST, in which each history has the structure
of Minkowski space-time, are developed in Müller (2002), Placek and
Wroński (2009), and Wroński and Placek (2009).
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• The notion of modal correlations, a.k.a. “funny business”, is analyzed in
Belnap (2002b), Belnap (2003), and Müller et al. (2008).
• Extensions of the BST framework are considered by Müller (2010), Placek
(2011), and Müller (2011a).
3 A landscape of possibilities
We are ready to approach the topic of the paper proper: different notions of
possibility, and the place of branching-based possibilities among them. In order
to motivate a number of different notions of possibility, we will start by picking
up some clues from science, life, and experiment (§3.1). The important issue
then is to get an overview of kinds of possibility (§3.2). The question of the role
of branching-based real possibility in this taxonomy we postpone to §4 below.
3.1 Motivational
Science seems to tells us, at its current state of development, that the world
doesn’t evolve deterministically; there are open future possibilities. This is
supported both at the level of phenomena and at the level of theories:
• There are phenomena, stable patterns in empirical data, for which no
widely accepted deterministic model is available. Arguably the spreading
of an epidemic or the dynamics of populations (both year-to-year and over
evolutionary periods of time) are good examples. One may also think
of the operational basis of insurance companies. (Those who think that
these examples don’t count because they are not fundamental enough, may
consider radioactive decay, or the phenomena of quantum correlations;
never mind the Bohmians, or superdeterminists.)
• There are well-accepted, highly applicable theories that are not determin-
istic according to various criteria. Quantum mechanics itself is arguably a
good example. Even classical mechanics admits certain forms of indeter-
minism, e.g., in the form of the famous case of five point masses discussed
by Xia (1992). And there is an intricate array of results available for the
determinism question in general relativity. See Earman (2007) for details.
It seems therefore that we need a notion of possibility of evolution of the world,
or of physical systems. These two don’t necessarily coincide. (In saying this, we
are saying that it is possible that they do not coincide. Here we are invoking yet
another notion of possibility, which may be identified as conceptual possibility,
to be discussed below.)
Moving away from science—closer to home, so to say—we also need a notion,
or again various notions, of possiblity. Our world is a world of possibilities. Con-
cepts presupposing possibilities are so deeply ingrained in our manifest image,
or commonsense view of the world, that it seems hopeless to try and do without.
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We hope, we decide, we gamble, praise, blame, and regret missed opportunities.
All these practical concepts—and there are many more—presuppose a thick
notion of possibility.15
Well, a number of our practical concepts we can perhaps understand on the
basis of an epistemic, subjective notion of possibility, where “X is possible” just
means “X is compatible with all I know”. E.g., when we hope for something
to turn out a certain way—like I hope that my daughter will lead a happy life
when she grows up—this may be taken to mean that it will really necessarily
be one way or the other (it is fixed what it will be), but I don’t yet know, and
all that the hope involves is a certain preference: that when I finally come to
know the facts, I will prefer happy facts over unhappy ones. This may not be
a coherent analysis of what hope consists in—hope is a much broader practical
concept really, which can, e.g., influence one’s current decisions. But even if
we grant an epistemic reading for hope, we surely cannot have such a reading
for other practical notions, like regretting a missed opportunity. I could have
brought an umbrella, we may think, dripping; I regret not having taken it. It
was there on the hatstand for me to take; I really could, and should, have taken
it. I could have taken it; it was possible, then, for me to take it. What would an
epistemic, subjective reading of that possibility amount to? Before I refrained
from taking it, I didn’t know that I wasn’t going to take it? It was compatible
with all I knew then that I should take it? That may be so, but something
seems to be missing. If before I took off, I didn’t know I wasn’t going to take it,
and now I know I didn’t take it, I have simply learned something. That is not
something to regret. In fact there is nothing, on the subjective reading, that
the specific notion of regret could hook onto.
Clearly we are entering difficult waters here. Some may say, so much the
worse for all this folk psychology. We ought not to place undue reliance on the
example of regret, since this is part of the notoriously difficult area of action
theory. There is no agreement on the analysis of human actions, and in fact
the debate seems to be stuck at a dead end. Methodological considerations may
have some purchase, but it is hard to say. E.g., a naturalist methodology may
urge one to dismiss concepts of folk psychology, while on the other hand, the an-
alytic tradition of conceptual analysis would urge one to start by acknowledging
(although in a defeasible way) the natural language concepts that we have.
In order to bridge this methodological gap, it is useful to focus for a while
on the notion of a scientific experiment, mainly because for the notion of an
experiment, both manifest and scientific image are crucial. On the one hand,
experiments more than anything else have helped and are helping to build up
the scientific image; a methodological choice to take the sciences seriously in
15And the same is true, actually, of ordinary theoretical concepts of kinds of things: for
something to be a human being, or a king, or a chair, is for indefinitely many counterfactuals
to be true of it. If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it may still not be a duck;
we also require that if you took it apart, you’d find a liver and other such things, and that it
would cease to exist by being taken apart, even if it never is.
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philosophy requires one to take experiment seriously, too.16 On the other hand,
however, experimental work in the lab consists of normal human actions and
proceeds, to a large part, in terms of our manifest image. In experiment, we
manipulate things, we interfere in natural processes, and all that, ultimately,
with our hands and feet. The lab is indeed a tellingly Aristotelian place (see
Wiggins (2001, 182)).
There can be no doubt that the notion of a controlled experiment, in which
an experimenter “poses a question to nature” by intervening in the course of
things to bring about specific experimental initial conditions, has been crucial
for the advancement of science. It is a huge difference, well known to prac-
ticing scientists, whether one can set up an experiment or one has to rely on
observational data from cases whose initial conditions were not controlled.17
Experiments aren’t always an option, though. It is not always possible to in-
tervene in the course of nature so as to fix certain initial conditions. Here are
some quotes, plucked from the internet, that testify to this:
• We can’t do experiments in astronomy, all we can do is observe objects in
the universe.
• On the global scale, we can’t do experiments . . .
• We can’t do experiments in large organisms, except in a very few cases.
• We can’t do experiments in humans . . .
These examples can be multiplied easily. As we can see, there are various factors
that can make experiments impossible:
• it may be physically impossible to set specific initial conditions: we cannot
ionize a single atom such that its total charge is 1/7 of that of an electron,
because charge is quantized;
• bordering on such cases (the line is certainly not strict), it may simply
be technically unfeasible to set specific initial conditions: there may be
no way really to find out about a snowball’s chances in hell—in a secular
environment, let’s say, at the center of the sun—because it is impossible
to get it there. Similarly, in cosmology, we can’t do experiments because
we can’t move around galaxies, and even if we could, we wouldn’t live long
enough (probably not even as a species) to learn anything from that;
• it may be unethical—this plays an important limiting role in experimental
physiological or medical research, both on humans and on other animals;
16Some will deny this, holding that experiment is nothing but observation. This is untenable.
For some hard evidence, consider the discussion about the role of the independence of the
polarizer settings, a.k.a. “no conspiracy”, in quantum correlation experiments. See, e.g., Peres
(1986).
17We do not need to go as far as Dretske (1994), who proclaims that we only understand
nature in so far as we can technically simulate her (“If you can’t make one, you don’t know
how it works”). See also note 16.
14
• it may be unfeasible for economical reasons (we can’t pay for it), politically
(we don’t want to know about this), or the police simply won’t let you.
It doesn’t seem possible (conceptual possibility again?) to give an epistemic
interpretation for any of these notions of possibility—they are all (at least meant
to be) objective.18
3.2 Possibilities: taking stock
Systematizing and taking stock, we have perhaps the following list of possibil-
ities, hopefully doing justice to the image of a “landscape of possibilities” an-
nounced in the title. It is certainly not one of the desert landscapes that Quine
said he was fond of. (Incidentally, we are not speaking about “modalities” in
general, but about “possibilities” specifically. This is not meant to exclude the
respective companion notions of impossibility and necessity, but just to narrow
down the field to one specific modal dimension. “Modality” is often used very
broadly for “all that intensional stuff”, including temporal, deontic, epistemic
and other notions. We could do with “alethic modalities”, but that’s such a
mouthful.) As is customary in logic (see also §2.1 above), we write possibilities
as diamonds, with an index to distinguish them. We have:19
• ♦l, logical possibility
• ♦c, conceptual possibility
• ♦m, metaphysical possibility
• ♦n, natural (physical) possibility20
• ♦t, technological possibility
Now we have a few labels; why is that a landscape? What are the interrelations?
Let us look at the delineation of these notions of possibility in order to discern
some structure. Here are some examples that set off one relation from another:
• ♦l (something is green all over and red all over)
• ¬♦c (something is green all over and red all over)
• ♦c (Bello is not a dog)
18Technological possibility is special in that it has a certain subjective element, viz., its his-
toricity: while technological impossibility now is intended to be objective, more may become
technologically possible (or in fact impossible) later on. Computer typesetting, for example,
was technologically impossible a hundred years ago.
19The list is not meant to be exhaustive. E.g., we omit ethical possibility, even though it
also features in the examples of impossibility of experiments mentioned above, because it is
not alethic.—One referee suggested to extend the list by a notion of “bureaucratic possibility”,
which would have to be given both a time and a place index for determinateness.
20A perhaps helpful idea here is compatibility with the laws of nature (if there are such
things). “Physical” may be too narrow, suggesting only compatibility with laws of physics,
which is why (following Fine) we prefer “natural”.
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• ¬♦m (Bello is not a dog)
• ♦m (the world is deterministic)
• ¬♦n (the world is deterministic)
• ♦n (one can travel across the Atlantic in 1h)
• ¬♦t (one can travel across the Atlantic in 1h)
In these examples it is assumed, of course, that Bello is in fact a dog, that the
world is indeterministic as a matter of physical necessity, and that what ballistic
intercontinental missiles do doesn’t count as traveling.
The examples show that we don’t just have different types of possibility—
there seems to be an ordering among them, giving something like layers of pos-
sibility, or at least a set-inclusion relation between different sets of possibilities.
In fact we have a number of such relations, quite obviously:
• Everything that is possible in any sense, has to be logically possible. Log-
ical impossibility trumps everything else.21
• What is technically possible has to be physically possible. We can think
of technical possibility as a constraint over and above physical (natural)
possibility: for you to be able to build something, it has to be physically
possible and feasible.
That’s fair enough, but what about the real dependence among these notions?
There is some debate about this. Do we need to acknowledge several irreducible
kinds of possibility, or will a single kind do? Can we defend a monism of
possibilities?
The logical empiricists thought that if you had to acknowledge any kind of
possibility at all, it had better be logical possibility, and the hope (e.g., Carnap’s
hope) was that one could analyze that notion in purely syntactic terms. But that
21Identity is a logical notion, and it is logically impossible for there to be a, b and c so that
a = b, a = c but b 6= c. As a direct corollary we can dismiss most if not all stories about
personal fission as not being based on any possibilities and thus as useless for philosophical
argumentation. (Note that cases of “split personality”, whether induced via severing the corpus
callosum or as a result of mental disorder, cannot count as personal fission either: the relation
of a brain a giving rise to a consciousness b and a consciousness c is certainly not identity,
again on pain of contradiction.) See Wiggins (2001, 72) for an elaboration of this point in the
amoeba case, where fission as a means of persistence seems to have at least some prima facie
plausibility.
There is a much deeper question behind this, which we cannot hope to answer in this paper:
How come that we seem to understand stories that violate logical possibility? What do we
see, e.g., when we see a picture with impossible shadows, or two Captain Kirks in the Star
Treck episode of the malfunctioning teleporter? We broadly agree with van Inwagen (1993,
229) that “one may not use examples from fantasy in conceptual investigations [. . . ] [because]
the author of a fantasy has the power to confer ‘truth in the story’ on known conceptual
falsehoods”. It seems very hard, however, to diagnose what is really going on when we are
dealing with such stories. Maybe the pretence theory of fiction (Walton, 1990), which has
recently been used in an interesting account of scientific modeling (Frigg, 2010), can be of use
here. The question undoubtedly merits further study.
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program has failed—it is widely recognized in philosophy today that stronger
notions of possibility are (also) needed. Present-day monism about possibilities
needs a different basis. Looking at the literature it seems that metaphysical
possibility is the best candidate for a basic modality. Or is it? Natural (physical)
possibility may also be a contender.
There is a convincing argument by Kit Fine showing that we will not be
able to reduce the one to the other either way. Fine (2005) starts by pointing
out that when we have two notions of possibility ordered by inclusion, as in the
case under discussion, there are two strategies available, depending on where
we choose to start.22 On the one hand, one can try to define the broader
notion, metaphysical possibility, as a widening of the narrower notion, natural
possibility. According to this recipe, φ is metaphysically possible exactly if it is
either (already) naturally possible, or it is (actually) a metaphysical truth. On
the other hand, one can try to define the narrower notion, natural possibility,
as a restriction of the broader notion of metaphysical possibility. Thus, assume
that the non-modal natural truths are given as a proposition P . (Never mind
the infinite case; we’re en route to a reductio. Let’s give the opponent finitude.)
Then φ is naturally possible if it is metaphysically possible that φ ∧ P ; i.e.,
there has to be a metaphysically possible scenario in which both φ and all non-
modal natural facts hold true. There appear to be no other plausible means of
reduction.
Will this work? Consider widening first. The given definition will fail im-
mediately if there are any cases of genuine metaphysical possibilities that are
neither truths of metaphysics nor natural possibilities. And that seems to be
so: There are metaphysical mere possibilities that aren’t also physical possibili-
ties. Fine’s actual argument is rather fine-spun, accommodating post-Kripkean
worries about alien properties and about the existence of universals in worlds in
which they are not instantiated (Fine, 2005, 240f.). But the following will do: it
is certainly both a metaphysical possibility that the world is deterministic, and
that it is indeterministic. But supposedly the world is one way or the other, and
its being so (of course, indeterministic) will be a natural necessity. So here we
have a metaphysical mere possibility (a metaphysical proposition that is in fact
false, but could be true)—that the world is deterministic—that is not a physical
possibility. See Fine (2005, 241).
In the other direction, restriction, we should grant that every physical pos-
sibility is also a metaphysical possibility. But what about P , the set of natural
facts that need to be available in order to tell the (fewer) natural possibilities
apart from the (larger group of) metaphysical possibilities? Recall that φ is to
be naturally possible just in case φ ∧ P is metaphysically possible. The worry
is that any P will be too weak to narrow down the range of metaphysical pos-
22Fine gives his argument in terms of the corresponding necessities; we are transposing
it to the case of possibilities. We therefore have to alter the terminology. Fine says that
the two available strategies for reducing natural and metaphysical necessity to one type of
necessity are restriction, reducing the broader notion of natural necessity to the narrower one
of metaphysical necessity, and relativization, reducing the narrower notion of metaphysical
necessity to the broader one of natural necessity.
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sibilities. Take any set P of occurrent natural facts; how is that supposed to
exclude (render metaphysically impossible) a de facto naturally impossible φ?
How could this work without admitting a basic notion of physical possibility
through the back door? A more general worry is that it will not be possible
anyway to show that modal facts—say, laws of nature—supervene on non-modal
ones—say, the Humean mosaic that Lewis bases his Humean supervenience pro-
gram on. Consider two metaphysically possible worlds that differ with respect
to their laws. Now take out all the bodies—that should be a metaphysical pos-
sibility as well. We’re left with two empty worlds, surely indistinguishable in
terms of Humean properties; but by assumption, these worlds harbour different
modal facts. So, facts about natural modality do not supervene on the non-
modal natural facts: there is irreducible natural modality. (There is no need to
worry about the simplistic idea of empty worlds playing a decisive role in this
argument; a more sophisticated version can be made to work as well. See Fine
(2005, 244f.).—This is not meant to suggest that everyone takes the debate to
be settled.)
So it seems that we are stuck with at least two basic kinds of possibility.
(Actually Fine argues for three basic kinds, a further one being the counterpart
of normative necessity. We will not discuss that notion here; see also note 19.)
Maybe we can reduce the rest—logical possibility, technical possibility and so
forth—to those two. (Fine suggests that that may be doable.) But there seems
to be no hope for a monism of possibilities. Our landscape really has some
distinguishing features.
The question that arises now is: what is the role of branching-based real
possibilities vis-à-vis the landscape of possibilities sketched so far?
4 Branching-based possibilities as basic
The upshot of our discussion in §3 was that possibilities are important and
intricate, and that it makes sense to speak of a landscape of possibilities be-
cause there are several different kinds. This leads to our crucial question: what
about branching? How do the branching-based real possibilities that were in-
troduced formally in §2, relate to this discussion; where is a place for them in
our landscape of possibilities?
In this section we will try to articulate this question in more detail (§4.1)
before we argue, first (§4.2), that we cannot even understand the mentioned
notions of possibilities unless we acknowledge the branching-based variety. That
is an epistemic point, which seems to be reasonably secure. Secondly, and
more speculatively, we will argue that branching-based real possibilities are
metaphysically basic as well (§4.3). So pace Fine, we might be able to defend
a specific type of monism of possibilities after all. This would however not
turn our landscape into a desert—rather, it would show that the richness of the
landscape of possibilities is, in an important sense, the same as the richness of
the world we live in.
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4.1 The question of the place of branching-based possibil-
ities
Recall that we singled out branching possibilities formally: they should be such
that they can be fruitfully modeled in terms of branching histories, either along
the lines of BT’s idea of linear histories, or in a more sophisticated, BST-type
way. The accompanying metaphysical image behind branching is the notion of
an open future of possibilities in contrast to the settledness of the past: once
open possibilities become unavailable, or drop off, as time progresses. Does this
notion of possibility correspond to any of the notions discussed in §3.2 above?
Or is there a radical difference?
We often invoke real possibilities with their specific temporal features, es-
pecially in practical contexts (see the example of regret above). They occupy
an important place for concrete issues in our lives: choices, decisions, and ex-
pectations. Accordingly, we may be tempted to draw a distinction according to
which real possibilities are appropriate for all concrete situations—ones that we
can identify indexically, or point to, so to speak—, whereas the other notions
of possibility are always abstract, not tied to concrete situations, and pertain
to situations only as described qualitatively one way or the other, without any
link to temporality. On this view, there would be a formal difference between
branching-based possibilities and our abstract kinds of (e.g.) logical, physical,
or metaphysical possibility.23
Indeed, branching possibilities are always tied to a context indexically, and
the branching possibility operator interacts with other indexicals and their re-
spective modalities in a specific way. Reconsider the regret case from above. I
could have taken my umbrella then: it was the case in a concrete past situation
that I could take it. Now that is no longer possible; I left the house without
the umbrella and got soaked. We can write this up in the following way (using
Prior’s P for the past tense):
P♦φ ∧ ¬♦φ,
it was the case that φ was possible but (now) it isn’t possible (any more). We
know that this is the way our lives go. There are all these possibilities, and we
lose more and more of them as we grow older.24 This feature is absent from all
abstract types of possibility: if a situation is given abstractly, via an atemporal
description, then if it can be assessed with respect to its objective possibility or
impossibility at all, that assessment cannot change over time.25 Accordingly, the
23There may be a further metaphysical difference in that branching-based possibilities are
grounded in actually existing things—substances—and their modal properties: dispositions,
powers, potentialities. We cannot explore this line of thought any further here, and we will
therefore continue to take possibilities to be basic for what follows.
24If there are infinitely many possibilities, their cardinality may remain constant—but still,
the set of possibilities diminishes over time.
25The case of technological possibility, on whose temporality we have commented above
(see note 18), is subtle in this respect. There can be a case in which something that was
technologically possible earlier on, becomes technologically impossible later, e.g., due to the
depletion of natural resources. (I am indebted to Gerhard Schurz for this point.) Let us
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formal demarcation is sharp and determinate. But phenomenologically, the issue
is not so clear. We also use the more abstract notions of physical, metaphysical,
and other possibilities discussed above in talking about very concrete, indexically
identifiable situations. Indeed, referring to the physical impossibility of some
concrete thing is often used as a valid excuse or explanation. Here are a few
random quotes from the internet that support the point:
• [I]t was physically impossible for me to travel from Batangas City to
Makati in time for the event.
• It was physically impossible for me to be at every different field trip and
event.
• [I]t was physically impossible for me to make the deadline (since you also
needed to mail the UPC).
• I wanted to attend some talks hosted by universities in the US, but it was
physically impossible for me to participate.
• It was technically impossible for me to include the ppt file to my website.
One also finds more contentious uses, like “It is physically impossible for me to
listen to Rush”, in which the modal claim may function merely as emphasis.
But it seems clear that at least the notion of physical possibility is sometimes
used when referring to concrete situations, not just to abstract scenarios.
Here is an idea on how this might be explained. We have seen above that the
notion of real possibility tout court, ♦, definable via the primitive modalities P ,
F and Poss: of branching time, captures our whole tree of moments and histories.
Saying that something is really possible means that there is a witness—a real
possibility—that is linked indexically to the moment of utterance. If we use one
of the other notions of possibility, then there are two options:
(1) It may be that what is said to be X-possible—physically possible, for
example—is in fact really possible. This means that talking about a phys-
ical possibility in such a case may just be a gloss on the manner of insight
into the possibility. The role of the available witness may still be left open.
Thus, it may be that we do not have to trace histories back and forth, but
just consider some physical facts: we may not even care that that which we
call physically possible, is additionally really possible.
(2) What is said to be, e.g., physically possible, may be merely physically,
but not really possible. Thus, there may be no real possibility, from the
beginning of our universe to the end of time, that two spheres of solid gold
hope that it will not be the case that in 100 years’ time, our descendants can say that it was
technologically possible to stop global warming in 2011, but it is no longer possible in 2111.
Still, the case about the abstractness applies if we read the time-index as belonging to the
possibility operator itself, so that in the example, we are in fact dealing with two different op-
erators, technological-possibility-in-2011 and technological-possibility-in-2111. Both of them
then apply to abstractly specified scenarios, without specific links to temporality.
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exactly the size of the moon collide head-on at a relative speed of 517 m/s;
but surely such a thing is physically possible, and we can even calculate
fairly accurately what might happen as a result. In this case, we have to
transcend our homely, indexically connected, branching notion of possibility
and jump, so to speak, to a merely hypothetical universe where such a thing
happens.
In case (1), the abstract notions of X-possibility play the role of classifying vari-
ous groups of real possibilities, so they do not actually point to a metaphysically
distinct notion of possibility. In case (2), however, we do need a notion of mere
X-possibility (an unreal possibility, as we might call it), where the merely pos-
sible scenarios are not connected to us indexically, but are given via atemporal
descriptions.
The notion of mereX-possibilities surely does useful work for physical, meta-
physical, logical, and other considerations. Most exercises in a physics textbook,
for example, are about merely physically possible scenarios, and yet solving them
is the way for us to learn the trade, even if in the end our aim may be to apply
it in thisworldly situations. On the other hand, one should not underestimate
the range of real possibilities. There is a substantial amount of real possibilities,
and once we recognise them, we are free to classify them more or less in any way
we please, e.g., by abstracting from specific features. Given a certain practical
mindset, it may be useful to classify certain real possibilities as dangerous or
safe; in a more theoretical mood, we may classify some as physical (we under-
stand why they are possible since we know the physics that generates them) and
others as conceptual (maybe because we can picture them clearly, without hav-
ing any idea about their physical basis). In this way, we can view the abstract
notions of possibility discussed above as abstractions or generalizations arising
out of underlying branching-based real possibilities.
This has an important consequence: If real possibilities are what gives rise
to our landscape of abstract possibilities, then what is really possible has to be
possible in every abstract sense of the word. It can’t be that something is really
possible while it is, e.g., conceptually or physically impossible.26 Formally, we
thus have
♦φ→ ♦Xφ,
where ♦ stands for real possibility tout court, and ♦X is any one of the abstract
notions of possibility mentioned in §3.2 above.27 The other direction needn’t
hold—in fact, it provides us with a test for checking whether we are dealing
26The usual caveats with respect to the temporality of technical possibility apply; see note 25
above.—To comment briefly on a further issue: Of course we can say that something that is
really possible, is impossible in some abstract sense. Bumblebees fly, that one over there is
flying, so it’s really possible for that one to fly; actuality implies real possibility of course. But
we hear it said that it is technically impossible for bumblebees to fly. This can probably only
mean that there isn’t yet a good explanation for the fact that they fly, and that we cannot
(yet?) build a machine that would do the same. (And actually even that is a myth: what
bumblebees can’t do, really, is glide. See Zetie (1996) for an illuminating account.)
27Again, the temporality of technical possibility (see note 25 above) requires a qualification:
the appropriate X has to be technological possibility now ; not, say, 200 years ago.
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with case (1) or (2) from the above list. Formally, case (1), X-possibility that
is witnessed by real possibility, amounts to
♦Xφ & ♦φ,
while case (2), mere X-possibility, is signalled by
♦Xφ & ¬♦φ,
i.e.,
♦Xφ & ¬PPoss:FPoss:φ.
4.2 The fundamental epistemic role of branching-based
possibilities
How can we learn about possibilities? Empiricist worries surround the notion
of modal knowledge, but denying that we have such knowledge is really just
a variant of skepticism. Minimally, we know that everything that really hap-
pened, was really possible before it happened; we know thar actuality implies
possibility:
φ→ (P♦Fφ & ♦Xφ).
That, however, does not give us an interesting notion of modal knowledge yet;
a skeptic could claim that the possible simply coincides with the actual, so
that we have modal knowledge only to the extent to which we have non-modal
knowledge. If one wants to avoid skepticism, one needs to argue that we have
knowledge of unrealized possibilities as well. But that, too, seems to be be-
yond reasonable doubt. Any real case of regret testifies to an unrealized real
possibility, and as noted above (the safer example), even our theoretical con-
cepts of kinds of objects presuppose modality (see note 15). There are countless
known counterfactual truths about the ordinary objects surrounding us. Most
of these are instances of knowledge of real possibility. But then, we also know
a vast number of possibilities and impossibilities that are not grounded in real
possibility, but abstract. For example, we can acquire a lot of knowledge of
logical possibilities by simple formal considerations—so many in fact that, as
mentioned above, for a time in the history of logical empiricism it seemed that
all useful knowledge of possibility could stem from this formal source.
We can take it as a given that we have various sorts of modal knowledge. The
question we wish to ponder here is whether knowledge of one sort of possibilities
can count as basic, or whether there are independent epistemic stories to be
told about our knowledge of real vs. unreal possibilities. The claim we wish to
defend is that knowledge of real possibilities is the basic phenomenon, on which
knowledge of unreal possibilities depends.
Research on causal knowledge has made it pretty clear that as human beings
we have the capability to build up modal knowledge from a very early age (Leslie
and Keeble, 1987; Gopnik and Schulz, 2007; Dullstein, 2008). Both observation
and active manipulation of the world around us play an important role in this
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process. It seems reasonable to assume that if we could not actively intervene
in the course of things (like Dummett’s imagined society of intelligent trees
(Dummett, 1964)), our knowledge of real possibilities would be severely limited.
The fact that we acquire modal knowledge of objects surrounding us, both
via observation and by active manipulation, underwrites our claim. We build up
knowledge of concrete possibilities and impossibilities. We often know whether
we can move a certain object before us, we may have tried before successfully
or unsuccessfully. I know that the cup before me might fall and spill coffee over
the keyboard; if I were to push it hard enough from this direction, it would fall.
(I have spilled coffee before.)
The importance of manipulation provides an illuminating view on the epis-
temological function of scientific experiments, and on the role of experiment in
establishing abstract modal facts (including, e.g., facts about the merely physi-
cally possible scenarios of our physics textbooks). In an experiment, we exploit
real possibilities in the lab, setting initial conditions and actively manipulating
things in order to pose a specific question to nature. We interact with the world
in a concrete situation in the lab; from our practice we know of real possibilities
that would mean that the experiment was a failure (e.g., insufficient shielding
from outside influences, or, in a biological case quoted by Bogen and Woodward
(1988), the scientist’s boss’s heavy steps on the staircase). Suppose that a result
is read off after the experiment. That reading was, before the experiment, a real
possibility. Depending very much on the local facts, that real possibility may
be interpreted as a physical possibility for an abstractly described (repeatable)
experimental set-up. The relevant step of inference has much in common with,
and may in fact be part of, the establishment of phenomena from data (Bo-
gen and Woodward, 1988). At the relevant level of abstraction, concrete real
possibilities that are too “local”, indicating various failures of the experiment,
will be abstracted from. In such a way the experimenter, through her local
modal knowledge, escapes the experimenter’s regress. The abstract modal facts
gained through experimentation can then be used to derive general modal facts
describing the behaviour of classes of systems, up to the formulation of laws of
nature.
As agents, we have a vast amount of knowledge of real possibilities before we
are ever in a position to even grasp the abstract concepts of unreal possibilities
discussed above. They are clearly epistemically secondary; modelled, perhaps,
on some formal properties of real possibilities, or on general rules of games of
make-believe. Once we have them, however, the table may be turned: If I know
that the situation before me is of a type for which it is X-possible that φ, and
there are no overriding factors (the infamous so-called ceteris paribus clause),
then I may well be in a position to argue that it is, in the present situation, really
possible that φ. What we have said here is not meant to undermine the relevance
of such inferences, but just to express a doubt as to their basic epistemological
status, and to indicate a way for understanding the ceteris paribus clause.
We have to leave a more detailed discussion of the epistemology of real vs.
unreal possibilities for another occasion. In concluding, we want to comment at
least very briefly on the metaphysical side of the distinction.
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4.3 A fundamental metaphysical role of branching-based
possibilities?
If we accept that we have knowledge of real possibilities—and above we have
argued that a denial amounts to a form of skepticism—, then clearly there
are these real, branching-based possibilities for us to have knowledge about.
Our world, really, is a world of possibilities, of things and living beings with
their individual modal properties. In a branching world, there is room for
substantial thisworldly modality—and such a world is a world even according
to the definition of Lewis (1986, 208), who demands unification by “suitable
external relations”, which are given in the form of the temporal-modal ordering,
≤.
This line of argument establishes a basic metaphysical role of real possibili-
ties, and our comments about their epistemology should at least make plausible
that we can have knowledge about them. What about the unreal possibilities
that figured so prominently in our first sketch of a landscape of possibilities,
and which pervade the philosophical discussion of modality?
A simple answer, which fits rather well into our overall picture, is that unreal
possibilities are just that: unreal. So there are, in an important sense, no unreal
possibilities. They are not there for us to use, to get to know by trying things
out, or to do anything with—except for the classificatory use, grouping together
different sets of real possibilities, that we acknowledged above, according to
which they are mere “creatures of the understanding” (to use a Lockean phrase).
But what of our landscape, then? What about the role of abstract, unreal
possibilities in physics, in logic, in philosophical argumentation and elsewhere?
We certainly do not want to deny, or to downplay, the usefulness of our landscape
of abstract possibilities.
The image of possible worlds may be genuinely helpful at this juncture—but
we will use it in a substantially transformed way. In Lewis’s usage, possible
worlds are there to do all the modal work in a unified fashion, providing the
basis for the most minute de re modal truths (“I could have one hair less than
I actually have”) to the wildest counterfactuals (“If there was time travel, hu-
mankind could win the robot wars”). Lewis achieves this unification by investing
heavily into a context-depentent notion of similarity between possible worlds.
This approach, which parallels the linguistic theory of Kratzer (1991), may be
good for the analysis of communication, in the context of which it was devel-
oped. What we propose, however, is that in the application to metaphysics, the
unified machinery misconstrues a crucial ontological distinction—that between
real possibilities, which are genuinely thisworldly, and unreal possibilities, which
are not—as a mere matter of context dependence.
We offer a different picture, and our claim is that our package is, on the
whole, more attractive. It is less revisionary, based on a clear formal seman-
tics, and keeps in touch with scientific practice. On our picture, the ontological
distinction between branching-based real possibilities and merely abstract pos-
sibilities coincides with the distinction between thisworldly and otherworldly
possibilities. Our world, the world in which we live, the world we interact
24
with, is rich enough to harbour a whole landscape of real possibilities, based on
the things around us. In contrast, we can think of unreal possibilities in the
manner of separate possible worlds, not connected to us via “suitable external
relations”. Physics textbooks may instruct us to imagine barren worlds of two
classical point particles, and to solve their equations of motion. The analysis
of an argument may point us towards abstract situations in which all premisses
are true, and ask us to determine whether the conclusion is true “there”, too.
We certainly need to take these moves seriously—but there is no need for us to
put serious metaphysical weight on them: this may be games of make-believe.28
Pace Lewis’s modal realism, a good case can be made for a radical ontological
distinction between our world and the worlds of unreal possibilities. Remember,
our world itself is replete with possibilities. These may be all that is needed for
our practical concerns, including our experimental work in the lab.
I could really write on, but the journal won’t let me.
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